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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONAL FERRIN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs Case No. 8571 
CLYDE W. FERRIN, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT 
This action was brought by the plaintiff in the 
lower court for the purpose of dissolution of a 
partnership at will and for an accounting and damages 
for alleged wrongful termination of said partnership 
by defendant in the lower court who appealed from the 
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decree of the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, one of th~ 
District Judges, of the District Court of the ·second 
Judicial District in and for the County of Weber, State 
of Utah. 
Respondent alleged that a partnership at will was 
entered into between h~m and appellant, known as 
the Ogden Alfalfa Mills, on or about January 1st, 
1948. This was admitted by appellant in his Answer 
to Respondent's Complaint, Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 
3, and in his Counterclaim Paragraph 2~ Also, upon 
his direct examination shown at Page 105 of the Tran-
script, Line 20, further Page 113, Line 7, and Page 114, 
Line 1. Respondent further alleged in his Complaint 
that the sum of $39,500.00 was paid to the previous 
owner Mr. Hawks out of income realized from the oper-
ation of said partnership, as noted in respondent's Ex-
hibit "A", to which defendant did not object, and which 
fact defendant admitted in his Answer, Paragraph 2, 
in his Counterclaim, Paragraph 3, and by stipulation 
through defendant's attorney Tr. P. 4, L. 23. 
Plaintiff below then alleged that on or about the 
20th day of April, 1955, defendant below attempted to 
dissolve the partnership at will, by opening an account 
in defendant's personal name rather than that of the 
partnership, with partnership funds. Defendant below 
admitted that on or about the 30th day of April, 1955 
a separate bank account was opened, in which plaintiff 
was not a part, Tr. P. 6, L. 13-24. This was admitted 
in Paragraph 5 of defendant's Answer, Paragraph 8 of 
his Counterclaim, and upon his direct examination, Tr. 
P. 109, L. 14-17, where in response to the question of 
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attorney, Judge John A. Hendricks, Esq.,: 
"Q. What did you finally tell him~ 
A. I finally told him, my wife and I, we just de-
cided to take the business over. 
Q. And he was out of it~ 
A. Yes." 
Plaintiff recalls that these 'events took place on or 
about April 30th, 1955, as the record so shows. 
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant at the 
time notified the plaintiff that he was taking the busi-
ness over, had drawn the sum of approximately $3,000.00 
in ·excess of that drawn by plaintiff. Reference to the 
Tr. P. 121, L. 1-18 shows that defendant had drawn 
$31,381.00 and the plaintiff had withdrawn $27,829.69. 
Defendent Counterclaimed and admitted the partnership, 
claimed about $9,000.00 beginning inventory and an 
additional investment of $965.00, Counterclaim Para-
graph 4, Tr. P. 192, L. 18-30, Tr. P. 193, L. 1-7 claimed 
further that plaintiff and defendant had agreed that 
defendant should receive $50.00 per month for over-
time and management of their business, together with 
$30.00 a month extra for bagging, and alleged that 
plaintiff violated that partnership agreement by refusing 
to bag, refusing to acquaint himself with the de-
tails of the business, grinding, marketing or soliciting, 
and that he did absent himself from business for as 
long as 30 days at a time, and refused to cooperate in 
purchasing new equipment, etc, all of which defendant 
failed to prove at the time of trial. (Italics ours) 
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May it be noted at this time from Pages 1 to 11, is 
information in the file on this matter and improperly 
set forth in appellant's brief. From pages 12 through 
20 is a mixture of fact and naration, most of which is 
not supported by the transcript of proceedings in the 
lower court, and is improperly set forth in appellant's 
brief. From page 21 through 32 and the first paragraph 
on page 33 is repetitious, appears in the file of 
this cause, and improperly set forth in said brief, and 
should be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Evidence is sufficient to support Findings of 
Fact. 
II. The Court did not err m denying defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
III. The Court did not err in appointing as attorney 
for receiver one whose firm was attorney for inter-
venors and attorney for finn in civil action filed against 
the defendant and Ogden Alfalfa :\Iills. 
IV. The Court did not err in refusing to let de-
fendant question plaintiff as to his solvency. 
V. The Court did not err in not ordering the dis-
charge of receiver upon the defendant filing a super-
sedeas bond. 
VI. The Court did not err in not decreeing that 
partnership existing between the defendant and plain-
tiff, terminated April 30, 1955. 
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ARGUMENT 
May it be noted that the first part of appellant's 
argument is a statement unsubstantiated by the trans-
cript and improperly included in said brief. With re-
spect to the $700.00 and $800.00 items, the Court will 
note in the transcript that the business paid the income 
tax for each of the partners and their accounts were 
credited with such being withdrawals. Certainly then, 
a refund should go to each of the parties to whom such 
a refund was entitled. It will further be noted with 
respect to the gas charges against the company by 
plaintiff, that once again the record will show, that 
both plaintiff and defendant were charging gas against 
the partnership account, and such was credited against 
each partners withdrawals. The tractor upon which 
defendant complained was also charged against plain-
tiff's withdrawals from the partnership business. Fur-
ther it will be noted there is no testimony in the trans-
cript, no allegation in any of defendant's pleadings, 
that there was any false entries furnished by plaintiff. 
Such was not complained of in defendant's counterclaim, 
and was not complained of until set forth in the appeal 
filed by defendant, and once again is improperly 
entered in said brief. It should further be noted that 
the brief sets forth certain attempts for reconciliation 
after the complaint was filed. Once again this is im-
proper material for said brief as was the constant refer-
proper material as was the constant reference to the 
Bunker-Tanner audit. Their record shows that de-
fendant refused to go over any records other than 
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his own. And it was concluded by all parties, that 
there was no possibility of reconciliation between the 
two partners. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
As to that portion of the Court Finding No. I, 
which says 
"April 30th, 1955, on which said date defendant 
wrongfully and without cause expelled plaintiff from 
such partnership business." 
Plaintiff calls this Honorable Court's attention to 
Tr. P. 6, L. 11-28, Tr. P. 7, L. 1-20, setting forth testi-
mony to the effect that defendant wrongfully attempted 
to terminate the partnership business on April 30, 1955, 
contrary to law. This was further brought forth in his 
cross-examination, Tr. P. 58, L. 18-21, where defendant 
merely notified plaintiff that defendant and wife were 
taking business over. It was further shown and ad-
mitted that defendant closed out partnership bank ac-
count and put partnership monies in his and his wife's 
private account without plaintiff's knowledge or consent. 
Now here in the transcript did defendant nor any of de-
fendant's witnesses prove that plaintiff took unreason-
able time away from work, caused da1nage to the part-
nership business, or did any more than atten1pt to bring 
his withdrawals up to that of defendant's. Defendant's 
own witness George Ferrin admitted that the partner-
ship business had not suffered as a result of plain-
tiff's actions. Tr. P. 54, L. 10-12. 
The allegations in Paragraph 7 and 8 of the de-
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fendant's counterclaim were not proved by any evidence 
whatsoever. Plaintiff testified that there were only 
minor differences between the parties and that no two 
people could get along perfectly. 
Defendant himself did not allege in his testimony 
any unreasonable time taken off by plaintiff. It was 
brought out however, that defendant himself had made 
a trip for a week to California, and had taken time 
off for Church work during working hours. 
As to defendant's wrongful attempt at dissolution, 
we cite the following: 
In 40 American Jurisprudence, Page 300, it is stated 
as follows: 
"In a proper case a Court of Equity may at 
the instance of one partner, dissolve a partner-
ship on the ground of the failure or refusal of 
a co-partner to comply with the partnership 
agreement or because such co-partner has re-
peatedly breached the partnership articles**. 
While one partner may not be authorized by 
reason of misconduct, gross neglect or breach of 
the partnership duty by another partner to treat 
the partnership where definite term as ended 
and exclude such other partner from the busi-
ness without a decree of dissolution, it is well 
established that Court's of equity will intervene 
and decree the dissolution of a partnership for 
various acts done by one partner in disregard of 
his duties toward his co-partners." 
See also Title 48-1-27 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and 48-1-28, Subsection (d) with respect to the right of 
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one :p8trtn.er to e4pel tb.e, ptlrer. 
In Roberts vs. Maraner, 245 Pacific 2d, 927, an 
O:regon ease, decided in 1952, the case reported the 
evidence showed animosity and disputes between the 
partners, however, in discussing the ~ituatio;n, with re-
~pect of the right of op.~ partner to terminate, the court 
held as follow~ : 
".A Court of equity will not decree dissolution of 
a partnership because of temporary or trifling 
disputes among the partners or fo:r a.nimo!'ities 
between the partners whiqh dQes Jl{)t injl!dt11l~ly 
affect the ~~rtnerslrip. *" 
This is almost exactly in point with the case beiore 
this Court wit4 respect to defendants grounds for at-
temvted termination. 
It is f1;1rther CQnte:pd~d by plaintiff~ tht~tt any dis-
sentio:Q or strai11ed relatio:n was OOl!~ed by defend-
ant hilnself rather tha:n by ~y action o£ the plaintiff. 
It was shown th~t pl~ipti{f had been uns-qec~~sfw in at-
tempting to draw out a sum equal to that dfQ.Wll out by 
defenda:ut, and was forced to ~gn a oh~ck to defendant, 
which defen<;l~nt c&Ued ~xtra wages iit 19&q, before 
defendant would pay one of the other br-other~ who was 
hired to help the two J?a:ftners. 
As to Finding No. 2, there is no question but what 
the Court has the pow€r t0 a1nend a Finding of Fact 
made by said Court when it is shown that said original 
finding is incorrect. It should be noted also, that said 
amendm·ent did not_ a:pd could n,ot affect in any way the 
decree of tll.e lower ~Qu_rt .. ~her~ is f-u.:rther ample evide.ll.ce 
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in the record for the Court to make this finding. Defend-
ant admitted that he, his father and two brothers, other 
than Donal, had leased the Ogden Alfalfa Mills from a 
Mr. Hawks, that the old arrangement was terminated 
December 31st, 194 7, and the new business, the partner-
ship between plaintiff and defendant began January 1st, 
1948, that the defendant and plaintiff purchased this 
from the Mr. Hawks, including the equipment and so 
forth, belonging to :Mr. John Hawks. 
As to Finding No. 3, there is ample evidence in the 
transcript to bear out the rulings of the lower court. 
Judge Cowley found that defendant was entitled to 
credit as his original cash investment, the sum of 
$3,804.29. This figure was testified to by the father 
of plaintiff and defendant, A. M. Ferrin on his direct 
testimony, Tr. P. 88, L. 3-14, where Mr. Ferrin stated that 
Clyde had never objected to the accounting he had pre-
pared at the termination of the old arrangement, Decem-
ber 31st, 1947. Clyde's share, at that time, was $3,804.29. 
Defendant admitted that the figure used to set up the 
new partnership was obtained from the original partner-
ship in 1946 and 1947. Tr. P. 118, L. 1-9. The Court 
allowed the additional $665.00 and $350.00 as set forth 
in the Tr. P. 123 making a total cash investment of 
$4,819.29. Defendant then claimed the sum of $5,000.00 
for equipment furnished to the partnership. The Court 
disallowed these items, cutting some down and disallow-
ing others and found that defendant was entitled to the 
sum of $1,180.71 for inventory at the beginning of the 
partnership arrangement. Defendant's own testimony 
shows that he claims $5,000.00 credit for a 11/2 ton 
Ford truck, a Norcroft chopper and grinder, bale loader 
9· 
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all.d trailer. L.~t us refer to each of these iterns specifi-
~a.lly. 
Defendant recalled -plaintiff's witness A. M. Ferrin, 
the father of plaintiff and defendant. In questioning 
him concerning the bale 1oader, Mr. Ferrin testified 
that the bale loader had been purchased out of the earn-
ings of the first partnerBhip, prior to the o-ne in question. 
That the sa:m:e was left o-n the premises for the benefit 
of the new partnership. That the sam~ at no time be-
longed to Clyde, the defendant in this cau~. Mr. Ferrin 
testified that t.bis w~s not listed on th~ old inventory 
and they all decided that Cly~ and Donal. the 
defenda-nt and plai.I).tiff, could have the same ·without 
paying for it. This tb~n, is an improper claim of the 
defe:p.d~nt a~ pa;rt of his begining inventory and right .. 
fully was disallowed. ~f. P. 181, L. 10-28, in~lusive. 
With respect to the Ford Semi, the same was true 
and defendant improperly claimed this as his own in 
the beginning inventory. Once again it was given to 
plaintiff and defendant at the beginning of the new 
partnership. The same being true of the trailer. This 
is set forth in cross-examination of Arthur M. Ferrin, 
Tr. P. 183, L. 1-28. Defendant attempted to prove that 
Mr. Arthur M. Ferrin submitted the beginning inven-
tory of defendant to Mr. Wangsgaard, bookkeeper, but 
was unsuccessful in doing so. l\Ir. Ferrin testified that 
he had never seen nor talked with 1fr. W angsaard; that 
h~ had no knowledge of where defendant obtained his 
beginning inventory figure of $9,000.00. Reference to 
the Transcript will ~how that def~ndant hilnself ad· 
mitted that the truck belonged to Mr. Hawks and was 
10 
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part of tlte equipment on the property at the time it 
purchased from him for the partnership. Tr. P. 151. 
Once again an improper claim by defendant as a part 
of his beginning inventory. The same is true with 
respect to the trailer claimed by defendant. In his 
cross~examination, he once again admitted that all but 
$300.00 of the trailer was paid for by the old partnership, 
and brought into the new. Tr. P. 152, L. 1-28. De-
fendant's own testimony, Tr. P. 149, shows that he sold 
the bale loader for $100.00 to people in Corinne and 
he does not know what happenled to the $100.00. Tr. 
P.149. 
The Court's Finding No. 3, is completely substan-
tiated by evidence in the transcript, the only evidence 
which could be considered in the decision of said Court. 
As to Finding No. 5, the Court found there was no 
agreement for defendant to receive extra money. Once 
again this is substantiated in the transcript. Plaintiff's 
testimony when cross examined, set forth this to be a 
fact. Tr. P. 48, L. 23-30, Tr. P. 63, L. 22-29, and on 
plaintiff's redirect examination, Tr. P. 75, L. 1-9. Arthur 
M. Ferrin, plaintiff's witness, also testified to this, Tr. 
P. 89, L. 24-29. Defendant's testimony was not con-
sistent, stated that the first records he kept of over-
time were begun in 1955, just shortly before this action 
was filed, and seven years after partnership entered 
into. Tr. P. 108, L. 10-20. He stated later that the 
records were begun to be kept in August of 1954. Tr. 
P. 191, L. 1-2. No such records were offered by defend-
ant. This surely indicates that defendant did not prior 
to this time have any definite agreement with plain-
11 
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tiff as to :extra money for overtime and bagging or 
management of the business. 
Under our Code, where there is no express agree-
ment for the same, neither of the partners may claim 
extra monies for doing extra work. Title 48-1-15, Sub-
section 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which states as 
follows: 
"No partner is entitled to remuneration for act-
ing in the partnership business except that a 
surviving partner is entitled to a reasonable com-
pensation for his services in winding up the 
partnership affairs." 
This Honorable Court, in Keller vs. Wixom, 255 
Pac. 2d, 118, decided in 1953, ruled that defendant was 
properly refused the opportunity to introduce evidence 
in support of his claim for extra compensation and 
held as follows: 
"That both partners rendered labor and services 
in the furtherance of the partnership venture, 
but that the appellant contributed more in this 
respect than did the respondent; that at the 
trial, defendant proffered evidence of his greater 
exertion, but the Court sustained objection to 
such offer on the grounds that as a n1atter of 
law, partners receive no cmnpensation for action 
in partnership business (other than splitting the 
profits) unless there was an express agreement 
or a provision for such ren1uneration." 
The Court further stated: 
" • * *'Amount of compensation 'either party in a 
12 
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partnership or joint venture is entitled to re-
ceive in the absence of a contract otherwise is 
dependant upon the profits made from such joint 
venture. We conclude no error arose in the ex-
clusion of defendants profer of proof.' " 
In the same vein, a California case, decided 1953, 
Bange! vs. Bange!, 254 Pac. 2d, 919-929, the Court held 
as follows: 
"The general rule is that in the absence of an 
express or implied agreement, a partner is not 
entitled to any compensation for his services to 
the partnership other than his share of the 
profit * *. The fact that one partner contributes 
greater skill and takes over the management of 
the business does not give rise to right to extra 
compensation without an agreement therefor." 
These cases are exactly in point and govern this 
eause. 
As to Finding No. 6, there was absolutely no testi-
mony in the transcript or any other proceeding in this 
cause, showing that plaintiff took an unreasonable time 
off of business during the seven and one-third years 
that the parties were together in the partnership ven-
ture. Defendant claims that plaintiff took as much as 
30 days at a time off, but off,ered no proof whatsoever 
of this. As it amounte.d in the end, there is some testi-
mony to the effect that plaintiff did take weekends off 
and apparently took one trip to Colorado. It is also 
testimony in the transcript to the 'effect that defendant 
himself took time off for doing church work, and also 
13 
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a vacation in California. With respect to plaintiff's 
refusal to do bagging, a reference to the transcript will 
show that plaintiff offered to bag, if defendant would 
do part of the delivering. Defendant refused to do 
this. This is shown in the transcript P. 74, L. 8-17. There 
is no evidence in the record that plaintiff wrongfully 
refused to bag, and no evidence in the record to the 
effect that plaintiff did not work in excess of 8 hours. 
Apparently the agreement between the partners actually 
was that defendant should do the bagging and plaintiff 
should do the delivering. Once again this is shown by 
Tr. P. 74, L. 8-16. 
As to Finding No. 7, there is no evidence whatso-
ever in the transcript to show that plaintiff refused to 
acquaint himself with the details of the business; that 
plaintiff took unreasonable time off from business; that 
plaintiff delayed the work prejudicially, or that plaintiff 
became arrogant and refused to cooperate in the run-
ning of the business Now here in the transcript are 
these facts proved or evidence even offered. 
As to Finding No. 8, there is ample testimony to 
support this finding in the transcript, and none contrary. 
Defendant admitted in paragraph nu1nber 5 of his answer 
that he opened a new banking account in which the 
signature of plaintiff was not necessary for the cashing 
of checks. His testiinony at the ti1ne of trial was that the 
new account was put in the na1nes of himself and his 
wife personally. Plaintiff at no time consented or 
authorized transferring of partnership account into that 
of defendant and his wife. 
The transcript reveals that the defendant wrong-
14 
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fully expelled plaintiff from partnership business as set 
forth heretofore in this brief. 
Defendant did not show reasonable grounds or 
any cause whatsoever for a proper termination of the 
partnership agreement. 
As to Finding No 9, the transcript shows that num-
erous attempts were made by plaintiff to even the 
account of the monies withdrawn by plaintiff and de-
fendant, and his unsuccessful result of such attempts. 
Also, he was forced to sign an extra check to def'endant 
in order to see that his brother John was paid for work-
ing for the partnership. Tr. P. 8, L. 1-15. 
As to Finding No. 10, the same is substantiated with-
out contradiction by the transcript where plaintiff testi-
fied that at no time did he authorize the audit made by 
the firm of Bunker & Tanner, as he knew that defendant 
would submit his own figures rather than the figures 
of both plaintiff and defendant. The audit did not show 
the true condition of the business and was submitted by 
defendant throughout the trial in his attempt to explain 
certain figures and disallow other figures of his claims. 
As to Finding No. 11, it was agreed by counsel for 
defendant and counsel for plaintiff that the sum of 
$35,000.00 would be used as a value of said partnership 
business. The stipulation was entered into and made by 
counsel for defendant, Tr. P. 1 and 2. It was further 
stipulated by both counsels that the withdrawals were 
the sum of $31,381.00 for the defendant and $27,829.69 
for plaintiff. Tr. P. 121, L. 1-18. 
As to Finding No. 12, a reference to the order made 
15 
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by the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, one of the Judges 
of the Second Judicial District Court, dated November 
22nd, 1955 will show that defendant was adjudged to 
be in contempt of court and there is no subsequent tes-
timony showing that defendant cleared himself of such 
contempt. 
Finding No. 13 is the only finding the Court could 
make in this cause, where defendant had attempted to 
terminate the partnership business wrongfully. Actually, 
under the laws of the State of Utah, Title 48-1-34 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the statute states that the partner 
not wrongfully dissolving the partnership has the right 
to wind up the partnership affairs. As to the appoint-
ment of the receiver, in a recent case, Seibert et al, vs. 
Shaver, 247 Pac. 2d, 609 (1952) by the District Court of 
Appeals, Second District, Division Two, California, it 
was held as follows : 
"The appointment of a receiver is confided to 
the discretion of the trial court * * * and the 
order will not be reversed in the absence of clear 
showing of an abuse of discretion. * * * It was 
not error to appoint a receiver 1nerely because 
plaintiff possessed other ren1edies which would 
have afforded mnple protection * * *. Where it 
appears that there is danger of 1nisappropriation 
of the propery of the partnership, and the evi-
dence conflicting as to the likelihood of loss, the 
reviewing court is in no position to say that the 
court below has abused its discretion * * * ." 
Such appointment is proper to carry the judgment 
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into effect to preserve the property during the pendency 
of the appeal. 
In the instant ease before this Court, plaintiff has 
submitted t·estimony to the effect that defendant has 
failed and intentionally refused to provide the books 
and records of the partnership since the 31st day of 
May, 1955, and has conspired to destroy certain records 
to prevent plaintiff from using them against defendant. 
Further, the partnership account was in defendant~s 
name alone, and under no control of plaintiff. There 
seenis to be no contrary cases coneerning the right of 
the lower court to appoint a receiver, pending appeal. 
See Clark on Receivers, Volume 1, 2nd :EJdition, 
Page 187, et. seq. 
POINT II 
The Court did not err in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
From the review of Point No. 1, concerning the 
Findings of Fact, as found by the Honorable Charles 
G. Cowley, in the lower court, it is clear there was ample 
evidence, and inde·ed in most instances, the only evi-
dence in the transcript upon which to base his 
findings and decree. The Court rightfully found de-
fendant was not entitled to a new trial, no error having 
been shown. 
POINT III 
The Court did not err in appointing as attorney for 
receiver one whose firm was attorney for intervenor 
and attorney for firm in civil action against defendant 
11 
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and Ogden Alfalfa Mills. 
From the examination of the file, it will be noted 
that the First Security Bank of Utah, Ogden Branch, 
was appointed receiver in this matter. It will be noted 
further, that the civil action referred to in appellant's 
point number 3, was where the father Arthur 1\I. 
Ferrin brought an action to determine his claim against 
the Ogden Alfalfa Mills. It was as much an action 
against plaintiff as it was against the defendant. 
Plaintiff has not objected to this action, realizing 
that it was stipulated that 11r. Arthur ~1. Ferrin has a 
judgment against the partnership. The matter has been 
concluded, and the receiver and attorney for the 
receiver are acting as agents of this lower court, 
and under the Court's strict supervision. Plain-
tiff has never questioned the honesty or integrity of 
First Security Bank, nor of its counsel, and there has 
been no showing of prejudice or injury resulting from 
such appointment. 
POINT IV 
The Court did not err in refusing to let defendant 
question plaintiff as to his solvency. 
Again, in reference to defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim, and all proceedings prior to the date of 
trial, there was never any hint of the insolvency of the 
plaintiff, and there has been no question as to his sol-
vency as to this date. The Court rightfully denied de-
fendant the right to question plaintiff as to the solvency, 
the same not being an issue nor being material to the 
cause in question. 
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POINT V 
The Court did not err in refusing to order the dis-
charge of receiver upon the defendant's filing a super-
sedas bond. 
As a matter of law, it is well understood that the 
filing of a supersedeas bond is provided for to stay 
the execution of the lower courts decree, pending appeal. 
Rule 73(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953. 
It should be further noted, with respect to the 
appointment of a receiver, that defendant had contin-
ualy refused to obey the orders of the lower court, es-
pecially those of the Honorable Parley E. N orseth. That 
defendant had been adjudicated in contempt of court 
for his failure to obey said order, and the defendant has 
continually refused to pay plaintiff as ordered by said 
court. Under the circumstances, the court has the 
authority, which is discretionary, to appoint said re-
~eiver and for the purpose of protecting plaintiff's 
interests in this cause, continne the use of said 
receiver until this matter is dispo~ed of and terminated. 
POINT VI 
The court did not err in not decre'eing that the 
partnership existing between the def~ndant and plain-
tiff terminated April 30th, 1955. Defendant failed in 
the trial in the lower court to prov~ any legally Sllf,. 
ficient grounds for his attempt at dissolution of the 
partnership. As a matter of fact, a reference to the 
Transcript and proceedings shows clearly that defend,.. 
ant breached the partnership agreement, and violated 
the partnership laws of the Stat~ of Ut.ah, in that he 
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refused to render an accounting to plaintiff, to permit 
plaintiff to equal defendant's withdrawals from the 
partnership business, refused to do the delivering at 
plaintiff's request, evicting plaintiff from partnership, 
and wrongfully closed out the partnership account and 
placed an account in his own name and that of his wife, 
all of which is contrary to the laws of the State of 
Utah, with respect to the partnership relation. Under 
Title 48-1-29, the statute is as follows: 
"Dissolution by decree of Court. {1) On appli-
cation by or for a partner, the Court shall decree 
a dissolution whenever: * (c) A partner has been 
guilty of such conduct as tends to effect pre-
judicially the carrying on of the business. * (d) 
A partner wilfully or persistently commits a 
breach of the partnership agreement, or other-
wise so conducts himself in matters relating to 
the partnership business, it is not reasonably 
practical to carry on the business in partnership 
with him." (Italics ours) 
CONCLUSION 
To support the findings and decree of the lower 
court, plaintiff and respondent has referred continually 
to the transcript and the pleadings and orders on file 
therein, which defendant and appellant has not. Judge 
Cowley was the trier of the facts to apply the law to 
said facts. There is ample eYidence shown to support 
the lower court in all its findings and decree, and there 
is shown a correct application of the law to those find-
ings of fact. It is well understood that where the 
Judge is the trier of the fact, his findings will not be 
modified if there is evidence in the proceedings which 
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will support said findings. The Judge was in the po-
sition to listen to the parties, observe their demeanor, 
willingness to answer the questions, and sincerety. 
The lower court rightfully found that defendant 
wrongfully attempted to dissolve the partnership re-
lations between plaintiff and defendant, and that plain-
tiff did not violate the partnership relations in any way. 
The Court then correctly applied the law, govern-
ing partnerships of the State of Utah, and decreed that 
the plaintiff was entitled for a decree of dissolution to 
be determined by the Court. 
Under competent 'evidence, the Court properly found 
as to defendants beginning inventory, cash and equip-
ment in sum of $6,000.00, and under Title 48-1-15 ( 4), 
correctly decreed that defendant was not entitled to in-
terest on his capital investment. The Court further de-
creed that a receiver should be appointed to manage the 
business and to arrange for the sale, setting forth the 
terms of settlement to each of the partners. Under 
48-1-29 through 48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
Court correctly decreed that the partnership business be 
disposed of and an accounting be made between the 
partners and payment made from the proceeds of sale. 
It is clear that there is no error on the part of the 
lower court, in the trial nor in the proceedings had prior 
to said trial. 
There is no ground for a new trial, and the order 
of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 2V/j:Zggm44 
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